Unified Kill Chain: In → Through → Out (18 phases)
Paul Pols' 2017 meta-framework that synthesizes the Lockheed Cyber Kill Chain and MITRE ATT&CK into 18 phases across three strategic cycles — In (gaining access), Through (network propagation), Out (achieving objectives). The key insight: attacks are campaigns, not chains — phases loop, repeat, and run in parallel, and half the model covers the post-compromise activity the original chain ignored.
The three UKC cycles
in → through → out · non-linear, loops allowed
In — gaining access & establishing a foothold
Phases 1–8: from recon to a working beachhead. Roughly the scope of the original Cyber Kill Chain.
Through — network propagation & positioning
Phases 9–14: where modern intrusions actually live. The post-compromise activity the original chain ignored.
Out — achieving strategic objectives
Phases 15–18: collection, exfiltration, impact, and the strategic "why".
1. Reconnaissance — Gathering information about the target
In — gaining access & establishing a foothold
The attacker harvests information about the target — people, technology, infrastructure, partners. In the UKC this phase also covers internal reconnaissance after a foothold, so it can repeat at any point in the campaign.
Who
Intel + SOC (detection is mostly passive here)
Defender goal
Reduce attack surface and detect targeted scanning that crosses into active recon.
Primary deliverables
Target profile
Exposed-service inventory
Likely access vectors
Common pitfalls
Treating passive OSINT as undetectable — the planning it feeds is not.
Forgetting recon repeats inside the network after initial access.
Framework mapping
Maps to ATT&CK Reconnaissance (TA0043) + Resource Development (TA0042).
An 8-step click-through using the Lazarus / Copperhedge sample already in the platform'sAI Report showcaseas the running example — covering all three cycles. Click a step to jump to that phase.
Step 1 of 8 · Reconnaissance · In
Scanning the React/Next.js surface
A partner feed + a CTF IoC report named Lazarus exploiting CVE-2025-55182. The WAF + load balancer logs show the list.txt scanning pattern hitting our Next.js 15.x prod apps.
Artifacts produced at this step
Target profile: 3 prod apps + 1 staging
Access vectors: RSC deserialization RCE
next: Deliver
UKC vs. the other frameworks on the platform
The UKC is a content meta-framework — it describes the campaign at 18-phase granularity. It does not replace ATT&CK (the technique vocabulary) or the process frameworks (F3EAD, F2T2EA, OODA); it feeds them with a complete picture of the adversary's lifecycle.
Note
Unified Kill Chain
content
What phases did the campaign pass through, across all three cycles?
Per-event reconstruction that fills in the who behind the campaign.
References
Paul Pols — "The Unified Kill Chain" (2017) — the thesis (TU Delft / University of Twente) that defined the 18-phase model. See also Cyber Kill Chain v2 for the Lockheed-side lineage.
Hutchins, Cloppert, Amin — "Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense..." (2011) — the original Cyber Kill Chain the UKC builds on.
MITRE ATT&CK — the technique vocabulary the UKC's phases map onto.
NIST SP 800-61 rev 2 — Computer Security Incident Handling Guide — the IR phases aligned with the Through and Out cycles.
MITRE ATT&CK Blog: "F3EAD: Operationalizing Cyber Threat Intelligence" (2018) — connects campaign-level content to the F3EAD process workflow on this platform.